School Choice with Crowding Education Resources: Theory and Experiments
| Project/Area Number |
22K13364
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Early-Career Scientists
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
ZHOU YU 京都大学, 経済学研究科, 特定講師 (40807450)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2022-04-01 – 2025-03-31
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| Project Status |
Granted (Fiscal Year 2022)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2024: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2022: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | School choice / Crowding effect / Education resource / Financial constraints / Auction algorithm |
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| Outline of Research at the Start |
Motivated by the empirical evidence, policy relevance, and the limitation of current theories, this project aims to develop a novel theory to examine school choice with crowding effects in the market design research and experimentally test the obtained theoretical results.
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
The first research achievement is that I published one journal paper and one working paper. My paper “Multi-object Auction Design beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples” joint with Shigehiro Serizawa is published at Games and Economic Behaviors.
I also published a working paper “Crowding in School Choice”, joint with William Phan and Ryan Tierney. This paper is one of the main results of this project. I presented this paper at the 2022 Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare. I visited Southeast University, Nanjing, China, Maastricht University, the Netherlands, Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and Paris School of Economics, France, to discuss with researchers there about my latest work.
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| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
1: Research has progressed more than it was originally planned.
Reason
The theoretical part of this project goes on well. Indeed, in my working paper "School Choice with Crowding," a joint work with William Phan and Ryan Tierney, I have completed the first two issues in my project. We not only study the strutual properties of our proposed equilibria, but also come up with an elegant algorithm that is strategy-proof and fair, and in particular, find the equilibrium that unaniomously maximize all students' welfare. This algorithm combines the classical deferred-acceptance algorithm and the well-know auction algorithm.
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| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
My coauthers and I are now working on the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium that we proposed in our working paper. By studing such a result, we can further provide more policy recommendations to the policy-makers. We are also discussing to introduce some constraints to our model such as the affirmative actions so we can apply our models to different countries such as U.S., Japan, and China. I am now discussing the experiment parts with researchers at the University of South Demark and University of Macau about programming and implementation issues.
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Report
(1 results)
Research Products
(2 results)
