| Project/Area Number |
22KF0177
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| Project/Area Number (Other) |
21F21309 (2021-2022)
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund (2023)
Single-year Grants (2021-2022) |
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| Section | 外国 |
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| Review Section |
Basic Section 05040:Social law-related
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
CHENG Shin・Ru (2023) 京都大学, 白眉センター, 特定助教 (20987383)
和久井 理子 (2021-2022) 京都大学, 大学院法学研究科, 教授 (50326245)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
CHENG SHIN-RU 京都大学, 大学院法学研究科, 外国人特別研究員
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| Project Period (FY) |
2023-03-08 – 2024-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2023)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000)
Fiscal Year 2022: ¥800,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000)
Fiscal Year 2021: ¥400,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000)
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| Keywords | aftermarket / market competition / IP rights / Antitrust / Competition law / Taiwan / Japan / US law / Comparative law / Platform / Bargaining Power / Abusive Practice / Anti-Monopoly Act / Fair Trade Act / Digital Platforms / Online Retailing Market |
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| Outline of Research at the Start |
The research aims at building a competition analysis framework for 'aftermarket' issues. For this, the research emphasizes the ideal balance between patent protection and market competition. It also considers the economic effects of foreclosure of aftermarkets and imposition of restrictions on users and compares the competition policies on patent exercise in the digital age in various jurisdictions. This constitutes the 2-year research project on abuse of superior bargaining position regulation and its roles to maintain competitive and innovative market in platform-centred digital economy.
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| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
Long-lasting products (primary products) generally rely on complementary products (aftermarket products) to increase their durability and value. Economic research suggests that suppliers of primary products in super-competitive markets, seeking to maximize their profits, may be incentivized to exclude competitors in the aftermarket. This phenomenon is particularly common in digital markets, where firms attempt to connect their own technological devices and information services to create a closed digital ecosystem. Existing competition law is meant to both protect competition and uphold intellectual property rights, yet authorities face substantial enforcement difficulties when digital marketplaces are involved. To counter these difficulties, this article proposes a competition law framework that would impose stricter restrictions on the firms’ exercise of intellectual property rights while relaxing enforcement authorities’ burden of proof, thus increasing competition in the digital sphere.
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