| Project/Area Number |
23243042
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
AOKI Reiko 一橋大学, 経済研究所, 非常勤研究員 (10361841)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
NAGAOKA Sadao 一橋大学, 商学研究科, 教授 (00255952)
MUTO Shigeo 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 教授 (50126330)
YAMATO Takehiko 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 教授 (90246778)
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
SHINBO Tomoyuki 関東学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (70533355)
TUKADA Naotoshi 政策研究大学院大学, 政策研究科, 准教授 (70599084)
ARAI Yasuhiro 高知大学, 教育研究部人文社会科学系人文社会科学部門, 講師 (20611213)
KISHIMOTO Shin 千葉大学, 法政経学部, 准教授 (00610560)
KAWASAKI Ryo 東京工業大学, 社会理工学研究科, 准教授 (20579619)
OHNO Yuka 北海道大学, 経済学研究科, 准教授 (50598480)
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| Research Collaborator |
OKUMURA Yasunori 阪南大学, 経済学部, 准教授
ENDO Shiguma 一橋大学, 大学院経済学研究科
KADOWAKI Makoto 一橋大学, 大学院経済学研究科
KAO Tina The Australian National University, Research School of Economics, Lecturer
SCHIFF Aaron Covec Co., Director
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥47,970,000 (Direct Cost: ¥36,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥11,070,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥11,570,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,670,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥13,780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥10,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,180,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥15,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥11,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,570,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥7,150,000 (Direct Cost: ¥5,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,650,000)
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| Keywords | 標準と標準化 / 特許 / 技術革新 / パテントプール / ライセンス / イノベーション / 国際研究者交流（仏、豪、台湾、蘭） / 国際譲歩交換（仏、蘭、英） / 国際情報交換（仏、蘭、英） / 国際研究者交流（仏、蘭、豪） / 国際情報交換（米国、豪、加、蘭、仏、英国、韓国） / 標準 / パテント・プール / 戦略 / ライフサイクル |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We conduct a multi facet examination of evolution of technology and standards. Case study of optical disk standards and data (standards materials) analysis reveals that standard establishment induces licensor (outsider) to invest in next standard, and initiation of standard setting process influences firm R&D decisions. We show using non-cooperative game framework that whether if the outsider and insider investments will lead to replacement or co-existence of standards depends on life cycle stage of underlying technology. Cooperative game concepts such as bargaining sets and the kernel is used to understand the licensing fee negotiation process, as well demonstrating that the relationship between patent substitutability and patent pool stability may be reverse of previous results in the literature if the pool royalty rates are not flexible. Standard setting process is analyzed with Nash Bargaining framework and verified with economic experiments.
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