Project/Area Number |
23330087
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Applied economics
|
Research Institution | Kwansei Gakuin University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
JINJI Naoto 京都大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 教授 (60345452)
TAKECHI Kazutaka 法政大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (80386341)
MANAGI Shunsuke 東北大学, 大学院環境科学研究科, 准教授 (70372456)
HATTORI Keisuke 大阪経済大学, 経済学部, 教授 (50411385)
KURODA Tomohiro 名古屋学院大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60377059)
HORIE Shinya 東北大学, 大学院環境科学研究科, 助手 (50633468)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-01 – 2015-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥14,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥11,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,450,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥3,250,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥750,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥4,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥990,000)
|
Keywords | 環境規制 / 所有権 / 市場構造 / リサイクル政策 / 譲渡可能な漁獲割当 / 最低品質基準 / 立証責任 / 市場構造と規制 / ITQと技術選択 / 循環資源貿易 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We examined the function and welfare effects of regulations on environmental protection and efficient resource use. In particular, we focused on recycling policies, minimum quality standards relating to food products, and individual transferable quotas on fishing activities. First, considering scrap markets and trade in wastes, we theoretically clarified the combination of optimal recycling policies. Moreover, using the commodity-level trade data, the effect of the Basel Ban was examined empirically. Second, using the laboratory experimental approach, we demonstrated that individual transferable quotas schemes are able to realize efficient fishing activities even if the choice of vessels by fishers are taken into consideration. Third, assuming oligopolistic markets and the existence of advertising, we investigated the welfare effects of minimum quality standards and entry restriction of low-quality products.
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