| Project/Area Number |
23330093
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic policy
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Future University-Hakodate |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
KAWAGOE Toshiji 公立はこだて未来大学, システム情報科学部, 教授 (80272277)
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
YASUDA Yousuke 政策研究大学院大学, 政策研究科, 助教授 (70463966)
TAKIZAWA Hirokazu 中央大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80297720)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-01 – 2014-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥11,180,000 (Direct Cost: ¥8,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,580,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥4,810,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,110,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | マーケット・デザイン / 学校選択制 / マッチング / ゲーム理論 / 実験経済学 / メカニズム・デザイン / アファーマティブ・アクション / 学校選択制度 / マッチング理論 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
As for school choice mechanism, theoretical analysis and laboratory experiments were conducted. First of all, consequence of affirmative action policy that gives quota for minority students was theoretically investigated, and its prediction was examined in the laboratory. Second, school choice mechanism adopted in Tokyo was investigated, and then experimental comparisons with other mechanisms adopted in the United States were done. In both experiments, though matching outcome of each mechanism generally consistent with theoretical predictions, non-ignorable number of students misrepresented their true preferences over schools. As a consequence, it was observed that in realized matching, there were a lot of students who had envy for other students. These results were presented at several international conferences, and now submission to academic journal is preparing.
|
