| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
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| Research Abstract |
This research project aims to models procurement auction mechanisms (rules or protocols) in the presence of a buyer and several (potentially) collusive bidders, propose a novel mechanism whose outcome is not affected through collusion (collusion-proof), and develop a technique for adjusting the performance. First, we extend a single-item auction mechanism to a multi-unit one where multiple identical items are sold and bidders may collude. This reveals that a collusion-proof mechanism is equivalent to the one that minimize buyer's payments in expectation. Second, we propose an alternative technology that automatically designs a mechanism via quantifier elimination and successfully construct a novel class of such a payment-minimizing mechanism for a restricted environment where a buyer is required to buy an item for sale. We further explore another case where sellers face the budget limits and find another class of desirable mechanisms.
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