| Project/Area Number |
23510184
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
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| Research Institution | Tokyo University of Science |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,120,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥720,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 公共施設 / 社会的選択 / 意思決定 / 社会工学 / 社会選択 |
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| Research Abstract |
When agents are located on a network, the provision of public goods is considered. Each agent has a single-peaked preference. We showed that if there were at least four agents on a tree network, then no social choice rule existed that satisfied efficiency and replacement-domination. Efficiency is an axiom meaning Pareto optimality. Replacement-domination is an axiom in relation to the idea of solidarity among agents when changes in preferences occur. In fact, these properties were shown to be incompatible, even if agents' preferences were restricted to a smaller domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences.
Moreover, it was shown that if agents' peak locations were restricted to either the nodes or the endpoints of trees, rules existed on a subclass of trees. We gave a characterization of a family of such rules for this tree subclass.
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