Theoretical Rationality and Empirical Implications of Nonrecourse Financing

• Project/Area Number: 23530217
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Section: 一般
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Kyoto University
• Principal Investigator: OSANO Hiroshi 京都大学, 経済研究所, 教授 (90152462)
• Project Period (FY): 2011 – 2013
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
• Budget Amount: ¥2,860,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥660,000); Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000); Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
• Keywords: ノンリコース・ファイナンシング / 証券化 / LBO / プロジェクト・ファイナンス / ホールドアップ問題 / ノンリコース・ファイナンス / レバレッジド・バイアウト（LBO） / ホールド・アップ問題 / レバレジッド・バイアウト（LBO）

Research Abstract

I analyzed the theoretical foundation of nonrecourse financing. This financing consists of securitization, leveraged buyout, and project finance and so on. I build a comprehensive mode that deals with these financing unifiedly, and show the rationality of these finacing under certain conditions.

Research Products

• [Journal Article] Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (2013)
  • Author(s): Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
  • Journal Title: Review of Financial Studies Volume: 26/ 10 Issue: 10 Pages: 2620-2647
  • DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hht027
  • Peer Reviewed
• [Journal Article] Nonrecourse Financing and Securitization (2012)
  • Author(s): Mami Kobayashi and Hiroshi Osano
  • Journal Title: Journal of Financial Intermediation Volume: Vol.21 Pages: 659-693
  • NAID: 120004920397
• [Journal Article] The New Main Bank System (2011)
  • Author(s): Mami Kobayashi and Hiroshi Osano
  • Journal Title: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies Volume: Vol.25 Pages: 336-354
• [Presentation] Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (2011)
  • Author(s): Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
  • Organizer: 5th Japan-Taiwan Contract Theory Conference
• [Presentation] Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model (2011)
  • Author(s): Keiichi Hori and Hiroshi Osano
  • Organizer: 5th Japan-Taiwan Contract Theory Conference(招待講演)
  • Place of Presentation: National Taiwan University