| Project/Area Number |
23530356
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
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Principal Investigator |
SANO Hiroyuki 小樽商科大学, 商学部, 教授 (60301016)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥390,000 (Direct Cost: ¥300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥90,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
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| Keywords | 地域間競争 / 政府の目的 / 間接的進化アプローチ / 租税競争 / 社会的選好 / 政治的競争 / 政治的交渉 / strategic delegation / 資本課税競争 / 財政均等化 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of this study is to investigate what type of preferences of a policy-maker in each jurisdictional government dominates as a long-run consequence in inter-jurisdictional competition with fiscal externality. To this end, I constructed a simple model of expenditure competition among jurisdictional governments adopting an indirect evolutionary approach.
I postulated that policy-maker's preferences are defined over a resident's welfare and a fiscal surplus that benefits only the policy-maker according to Edwards-Keen (1996) although the preference type is endogenously determined as an evolutionary equilibrium. I showed in my model that a purely benevolent policy-maker cannot survive in the long-run and the resident's welfare is lower than the one in a Nash equilibrium. However, this study has not been completed at the present time.
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