A theoretical and empirical analysis of efficiency and inefficiency which an intergovernmental competition would intensify in a fiscal decentralized society
| Project/Area Number |
23530372
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Oita University |
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Principal Investigator |
IDA Tomoya 大分大学, 経済学部, 教授 (50315313)
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| Research Collaborator |
WILHELMSSON Mats スウェーデン王立工科大学, 建築環境学部, 教授
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | 国際研究者交流 / スウェーデン / 地方分権 / 租税外部性 / 足による投票 |
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| Research Abstract |
Tiebout hypothesis posits that residential sorting can lead to an efficient provision of local public goods in a decentralized society. By contraries, literatures on tax competition find two types of tax externalities which distort an optima level of local taxes in a fiscal system where different hierarchical governments locally share the same tax base. This analysis empirically investigates the two contrary hypotheses about fiscal decentralization by using Swedish regional data set. Consequently, we can find that in addition to the coexistence of both effects, a dominant vertical tax externality would higher suboptimally local tax rates.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
