| Project/Area Number |
23530382
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Keio University (2012-2013)
Hosei University (2011) |
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Principal Investigator |
TERAI Kimiko 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 教授 (80350213)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 国際公共財 / 国際協約 / 環境保護条約 / シグナリング・モデル / 時間的不整合性 / 環境外部性 / シグナリング / 地域間競争 |
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| Research Abstract |
Environmental protection is a global public good that generates transnational benefit spillovers. International environmental agreements frequently fail to be enforced since there is no powerful supranational organization that is independent of the interests of participating countries. It is the best response for each country to promise cooperation ex ante and deviate ex post, which produces the time-inconsistency problem. We compose a signaling model including politicians' concerns for re-election since their diplomatic performance in negotiations toward an agreement is evaluated in the context of domestic elections. Also we focus on the financial mechanism created by agreements, which receives contributions from participating donor countries and disburses funds to compensate for the additional costs for compliance. Its original purpose was to provide developing countries with financial assistance, but we show that it also serves as a commitment device encouraging compliance.
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