An inquiry into the opportunistic behavior by decision makers : Heisei Municipality Amalgamation in Japan
| Project/Area Number |
23530390
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Doshisha University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | 公共選択 / 市町村合併 / 多選 / 首長 / 選挙 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research revisits the issue of elected officials’terms by examining how the cumulative tenure of municipality mayors affects budget size and local government consolidations. Multi-term incumbents enjoy greater rent-seeking potential from government expenditure through learning-by-doing. Their effort levels in budget formulation rise with the length of service and thereby budget size tends to grow with cumulative mayoral terms. They are also more likely to pursue mergers in which their localities are the dominant entities. We test these hypotheses using data on municipalities in Japan and find that long-serving mayors expand public activities and engage in consolidations with smaller partners.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
