| Project/Area Number |
23530553
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Commerce
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| Research Institution | Ritsumeikan University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
米山 高生 一橋大学, 商学研究科, 教授 (00175019)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | Adverse selection / Selective effects / Whole life insurance / Term life insurance / Automatic renewal / 逆選択 / モラルハザード / 生命保険 / アクチュアリー / 死亡保険 / ミクロデータ / 自殺 |
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| Research Abstract |
This study provides empirical evidence consistent with the existence of adverse selection in the life insurance market. An analysis of micro data from more than 1.6 million automatic renewal term life insurance contracts, issued by a Japanese life insurance company, reveals that owing to medical and other selections, neither adverse selection nor moral hazard problems could not be recognized with an automatic renewal term life insurance (before renewal). However, after the renewal, adverse selection and moral hazard did occur in the subsequent 10 years. Considering intensifying price competition, a review of automatic renewal of term life insurance may be required for equal distribution of the financial burden amongst policyholders and for the financial soundness of life insurance companies.
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