Research on Foundation of forming coalition and equilibrium for games with incomplete information
| Project/Area Number |
23540175
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
General mathematics (including Probability theory/Statistical mathematics)
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| Research Institution | Ibaraki National College of Technology |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥520,000 (Direct Cost: ¥400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥120,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
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| Keywords | 提携行動均衡 / 不確実性 / ナッシュ均衡 / 抽象ゲーム / 安定集合 / 情報交換過程 / 経営者ー労働者モデル / 提携行動予想均衡解 / 知識構造 / 努力水準予想値 / 利益配分関数 / 提携行動予測均衡 / 不完全情報 / 倫理崩壊 / コミュニケーション論理 / 完全性 / 行動予測提携 / 共有知識 / 合意形成 / 多重様相論理 / 期待限界費用 / 弱選好順序 / Jiang写像 / コミュニケーション / 国際研究者交流（中国、ロシア） |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The one of purposes of this research program is to fulfill the gap between `non-cooperative games' and `cooperative games'. For the purpose, (1) the characterization of stable sets in the framework of 'abstract games' is treated by using the new notion of 'Jiang mapping'. The another purpose of the program is to investigate the gap from the epistemic point of view: The view point is based that the decision making for each agent is determined by his/her conjectures given by the individual knowledge structure. Concretely, focusing on the epistemic conditions for agents' knowledge,I tackled the following three topics: (2) The new equilibrium concept `coalition Nash equilibrium' leads to a Nash equilibrium through the communication about their conjectures on the others' actions among all members in a coalition. (3) In extended principal-agent model under uncertainty, a resolution of moral hazard is studied as the agreement problem of the refunds.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(46 results)
