Theoretical study of evolutionary mechanisms of polymorphism of anti-herbivore defense in plant
| Project/Area Number |
23570023
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Ecology/Environment
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| Research Institution | Kyoto University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥2,080,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥480,000)
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| Keywords | 進化 / 植物防衛 / 協力ゲーム / 多型 / 理論 / 防衛形質 / 協力 / 国際情報交換 / アメリカ / イギリス / ドイツ / 台湾 / 防衛 |
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| Research Abstract |
In anti-herbivore defenses in plant species, genetic polymorphism of defensive level is sometime observed within a single population. In order to understand mechanisms resulting in the polymorphism of trait that influences interaction among individuals, I analyzed its evolutionary process from a viewpoint of game theory. I focus on a cooperative game, in which an individual investment benefits members of the interacting group. According to the analysis, it is shown that a possibility of occurrence of polymorphism significantly depends on properties of benefit and cost functions of cooperation. For example, the benefit can be a function of the total investments, or a total of functions of each investment. Evolutionary branching and following polymorphism evolution are possible in the former, but impossible in the latter. The study successfully revealed evolutionary conditions of a class of cooperation, involving anti-herbivore defenses in plants.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(62 results)
