| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This paper is about irrigation development, and its management-performance influence on agricultural production. The focus is on systems in Nepal and Indonesia, incorporating Ostrom’s design principles and game theory. Better-managed irrigation systems all but satisfy Ostrom’s principle criterion. Even with the design principle not satisfied, one irrigation system in Nepal was maintained - albeit incompletely - albeit incompletely - through the efforts of voluntary downstream farmers. We analyze this situation by applying chicken game theory, and find that upstream farmers are free-riding on downstream farmers. As the cost of maintenance of the system increases due to rising wages and the dilapidated state of the waterway, downstream farmers are unable to maintain the system without the cooperation of upstream farmers. We conclude by showing that irrigation systems may deteriorate depending on the strategy of upstream farmers.
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