A challenge; Evolutionary Game theory applying to dynamics of vehicle agents in traffic jam and its understanding of macroscopic phenomenon
Project/Area Number |
23651156
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Challenging Exploratory Research
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Social systems engineering/Safety system
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Research Institution | Kyushu University |
Principal Investigator |
TANIMOTO Jun 九州大学, 総合理工学研究院, 教授 (60227238)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
HAGISHIMA Aya 九州大学, 総合理工学研究院, 准教授 (60294980)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
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Keywords | モデリング / 渋滞学 / 進化ゲーム理論 / 交通流 / 進化ゲーム / 動力学 / 社会ジレンマ |
Research Abstract |
Following previous works by Yamauchi et al. (PRE 79) and Nakata et al. (Physica A 389), who investigated whether a traffic flow with lane closing instinctively contains social dilemma, another question of whether lane changes in a traffic flow without any evident bottlenecks bring about social dilemma structures. Simulation result reveals that flow phases featured with high flux and high density have obvious social dilemma classified with Prisoner’s Dilemma, where all drivers tend to take the strategy trying lane changes as long as possible, and this causes the worst beneficial situation from social benefit point of view. Whereas, in flow regimes having local jams but much more flux than entire jam phase, frequent lane changes can rather improve the total social payoff, defined by averaged flux, because driving with lane changes can earn pretty small forward gains, leading to larger flux than driving without any lane changes.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(14 results)