Micro-Theoretical Analysis on Market Competition and Auctions
| Project/Area Number |
23683002
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (A)
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies |
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Principal Investigator |
YASUDA Yosuke 政策研究大学院大学, 政策研究科, 助教授 (70463966)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-01 – 2014-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥9,100,000 (Direct Cost: ¥7,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,100,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥3,900,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥900,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
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| Keywords | オークション / ゲーム理論 / ミクロ経済理論 / 制度設計 / 市場競争 |
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| Research Abstract |
This research considers license auctions whose outcome directly affects market structure, and analyzes a mechanism that maximizes social welfare. As a main result, I show that optimal entry is implemented through a handicap auction in which the newcomer's payment is discounted by a pre-determined fraction (if it wins). Moreover, the actual size of optimal handicap is calculated under different situations, and the robustness of these results are investigated.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(36 results)
