Theory and applications of incentives in dynamic contests

• Project/Area Number: 23730190
• Research Category: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• Allocation Type: Multi-year Fund
• Research Field: Economic theory
• Research Institution: Hiroshima University
• Principal Investigator: OGAWA Ryo 広島大学, 大学院・社会科学研究科, 特任准教授 (50533204)
• Project Period (FY): 2011 – 2012
• Project Status: Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
• Budget Amount: ¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000); Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000); Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
• Keywords: ゲーム理論 / ミクロ経済学 / オークション

Research Abstract

We analyzed incentives in long-term contests between various agents in a framework of game theory and auctions. We formalized the problem from the viewpoint of contestants and analyzed the optimal design of effort-maximizing contests.

Research Products

• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design (2011)
  • Author(s): Minoru Kitahara and Ryo Ogawa
  • Organizer: 5thJapan-Taiwan Contract Theory Conference
  • Place of Presentation: 国立中央大学 (台湾)
  • Year and Date: 2011-12-03
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design (2011)
  • Author(s): Minoru Kitahara and Ryo Ogawa
  • Organizer: 日本経済学会
  • Place of Presentation: 筑波大学
  • Year and Date: 2011-10-23
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design (2011)
  • Author(s): Minoru Kitahara and Ryo Ogawa
  • Organizer: Summer Workshop on Economic Theory
  • Place of Presentation: 北海道大学
  • Year and Date: 2011-08-04
• [Presentation] All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps (2011)
  • Author(s): Minoru Kitahara and Ryo Ogawa
  • Organizer: 16thInternational Economic Association World Congress
  • Place of Presentation: 清華大学(中国)
  • Year and Date: 2011-07-05
• [Presentation] All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps (2011)
  • Author(s): Minoru Kitahara and Ryo Ogawa
  • Organizer: 10th journees Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet
  • Place of Presentation: マルセイユ(フランス)
  • Year and Date: 2011-06-21
• [Presentation] Virtual valuation in dynamic contest design
  • Author(s): 尾川僚
  • Organizer: 岡山大学現代経済セミナー
  • Place of Presentation: 岡山大学
• [Presentation] Efficiency versus Economy of Time in Japanese Flower Markets
  • Author(s): 尾川僚
  • Organizer: Nanyang Technological University
  • Place of Presentation: Nanyang Technological University（シンガポール）
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 組織と制度の経済学研究会(OEIO)
  • Place of Presentation: 大阪大学
• [Presentation] All-Pay Auction with Handicaps
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 10th journees Louis-Andre Gerard-Varet
  • Place of Presentation: 仏マルセイユ
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 契約理論研究会東(CTWE)
  • Place of Presentation: 一橋大学
• [Presentation] All-Pay Auction with Handicaps
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: International Economic Association World Congress
  • Place of Presentation: 中国・清華大学
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 経済理論夏季研究会(SWET)
  • Place of Presentation: 北海道大学
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 契約理論研究会(CTW)
  • Place of Presentation: 北海道大学
• [Presentation] Virtual Valuation in Dynamic Contest Design
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 日本経済学会秋季大会
  • Place of Presentation: 筑波大学
• [Presentation] Optimal Dynamic Handicapping
  • Author(s): 尾川 僚
  • Organizer: 第5回日台契約理論学会
  • Place of Presentation: 台湾・国立中央大学