A theoretical analysis of a keyword auction: How rational the current settings of keyword auction are
| Project/Area Number |
23730194
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kochi University of Technology (2013)
Waseda University (2011-2012) |
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Principal Investigator |
KAMIJO Yoshio 高知工科大学, 経営学部, 准教授 (40453972)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2013
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥1,950,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥450,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | オークション / インターネット検索エンジン / 広告 / ゲーム理論 / コンピュータシミュレーション / 一般化第二価格オークション / VCGメカニズム / 制度 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research project is to explore how rational the current settings of keyword auctions are by means of a game theoretic analysis and a computer simulation.
In the first study, we explore a slot supply strategy of a search engine. Based on the revenue prediction from a game theoretic analysis, we show that restricting the number of the ads in a search result page and highlighting the top ads are consistent with the revenue maximization of the sellers.
In the second study, we explore the bidding behavior of advertisers in a sealed-bid environment, where each bidder does not know the current bids of others. It is shown that even in a sealed bid environment, bid profie of advertisers converges to some equilibrium point in a one-shot game. Simulation results verify that a sealed-bid environment would be beneficial to search engines.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(11 results)
