Measuring the Welfare Losses from Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets
| Project/Area Number |
23730261
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Meiji Gakuin University (2012-2014)
Tezukayama University (2011) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 情報の非対称性 / 逆選択 / モラルハザード / 保険 / 厚生 / 自動車保険 / 年金 / 中小企業金融 / 社会厚生 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We have examined the role of asymmetric information in the real economy. We have measured how much inefficiency created by asymmetric information, and then explored the better policy. In the automobile insurance market, we estimated that the loss from adverse selection and/or moral hazard was 1,000 yen compared to the premium of 7,000 yen. In the credit guarantee scheme, we found that our data was consistent with adverse selection and moral hazard hypotheses, and that the role of deductibles are effectively working, if not perfectly eliminate the inefficiency. In the annuity market, we obtained the results that the people with public pension live longer than those without, which is consistent with adverse selection story. We have also measured the loss from asymmetric information, but we are still working on it because our tentative estimates rely heavily on some strong assumptions.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(10 results)
