Analysis of the impact of strategic consideration and managerial self- interested incentive on corporate investment and financing decisions.
| Project/Area Number |
23730353
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Business administration
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| Research Institution | Kagawa University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011-04-28 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
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| Keywords | リアルオプション / 投資の意思決定 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The research examined the impact of strategic consideration and managerial self- interested incentive on corporate investment and financing decisions by employing a real options model. It demonstrated that strategic behaviors of competing firms that intend to preempt their competitor have impacts on the timing of market entry, production capacity scale, and degree of product differentiation. It demonstrated that managerial optimism and over-confidence regarding investment values cause the dependence of managerial investment decisions on corporate internal funds because they induce managers to misperceive undervaluation of the firm's equity. The optimistic and over-confident manager delays investing relative to the optimal decision that maximizes firm value if all investment costs are financed with external equity issuance. In addition, internal funds induce the manager to expedite investing. There exists the optimal level of internal funds that attains the optimal investment decision.
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Report
(5 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
