| Project/Area Number |
23730396
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Business administration
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Tezukayama University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
KONDO Emi 帝塚山大学, 経営学部, 講師 (50581485)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥260,000 (Direct Cost: ¥200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥60,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | アナリスト / 株式レーティング / アナリスト予想 / 利益相反 / 楽観的バイアス / セルサイド・アナリスト / アナリスト・レポート / 証券会社 / 株式推奨 / 予想利益 / 幹事会社 / アンダーライター / バイアス |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
In this reseach,I examine the growing empirical literature on the analysts' forecasts and conflicts of interest in the U.S.Three reasons are often cited for analyst optimism.First, prior research argues that analysts positively bias their forecasts and recommendations to stay on friendly terms with firm management.Second,it is also argued that analysts who work for integrated investment banking houses could come under implicit pressure to publish more favorable research about their employers' current or potential clients to help boost investment banking fee revenue. Third, analysts could come under pressure to help generate brokerage commissions, which provides incentives for analysts to present positively biased opinions.
Despite these incentives to bias their forecasts, analysts are also concerned about their career advancement that can be facilitated by acquiring a higher reputation through more accurate forecasts. Analysts appear to face a dilemma caused by different incentives.
|
