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Game TheoreticAnalysis and Design of Multi-Object Auctions

Research Project

Project/Area Number 23830039
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionOsaka University

Principal Investigator

SANO Ryuji  大阪大学, 社会経済研究所, 講師 (50611208)

Project Period (FY) 2011 – 2012
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
Budget Amount *help
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Keywords経済理論 / オークション
Research Abstract

I study auctions of multiple objects and multiple units, and investigate bidders’ incentive and equilibrium allocations in them. ``Combinatorial auctions’’ are those auctions in which bidders submit bids not only for individual objects but for combinations (or packages) of objects. In this research, I characterized a class of combinatorial auctions in which a particular strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium. In addition, I derived an equilibrium in an ascending-price auction that has recently been used in some applications.

Report

(3 results)
  • 2012 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2011 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (15 results)

All 2013 2012 2011 Other

All Journal Article (2 results) (of which Peer Reviewed: 2 results) Presentation (10 results) Remarks (3 results)

  • [Journal Article] Vickrey-reserve auctions and an equilibrium equivalence2013

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Journal Title

      Mathematical Social Sciences

      Volume: 65 Issue: 2 Pages: 112-117

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.10.005

    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report 2012 Final Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Journal Article] Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction2012

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Journal Title

      Games and Economic Behavior

      Volume: 74 Issue: 2 Pages: 637-650

    • DOI

      10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.016

    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report 2011 Annual Research Report
    • Peer Reviewed
  • [Presentation] A Dyanmic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Lengths of Use2013

    • Author(s)
      佐野隆司
    • Organizer
      ゲーム理論ワークショップ
    • Place of Presentation
      一橋大学
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-target strategy and the core in ascending combinatorial auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      佐野隆司
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      九州産業大学
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-target strategy and the core in ascending combinatorial auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      佐野隆司
    • Organizer
      DC コンファレンス
    • Place of Presentation
      関西大学
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-target strategy and the core in ascending combinatorial auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      Meeting of Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      India Habitat Centre(インド)
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-target strategy and the core in ascending combinatorial auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      World Congress of the Game Theory Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Bilgi University(トルコ)
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      World Congress of the Game Theory Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul Bilgi University
    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      Meeting of Society for Social Choice and Welfare
    • Place of Presentation
      India Habitat Centre
    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] The Vickrey-Target Strategy and the Core in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions2012

    • Author(s)
      佐野隆司
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      九州産業大学
    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction2011

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2011
    • Place of Presentation
      オスロ大学(ノルウェー)
    • Year and Date
      2011-08-28
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction2011

    • Author(s)
      Ryuji Sano
    • Organizer
      Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society 2011
    • Place of Presentation
      高麗大学(韓国)
    • Year and Date
      2011-08-13
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      https://sites.google.com/site/sanosweb/english

    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Remarks] 研究者個人ウェブページ

    • URL

      http://sites.google.com/site/sanosweb/

    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report
  • [Remarks]

    • URL

      http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/faculty/r-sano.html

    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report

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Published: 2011-09-05   Modified: 2019-07-29  

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