On the durability of Liberal Democracy : by the revision of Arrow's Theorem
| Project/Area Number |
23830085
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Politics
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| Research Institution | Waseda University |
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Principal Investigator |
SAITO Nao 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (20612831)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2011 – 2012
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,210,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥510,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | デモクラシー論 / アローの定理 / リベラル・デモクラシー / 社会的選択理論 / 政治理論 / 政治思想 |
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| Research Abstract |
The purpose of this research is to verify negative implication of Arrow's general impossibility theorem in the theory of liberal democracy. Also, it is to protect liberal democracy from the theorem.
The conclusion of this research is as follow; Arrow's theorem denies the possibility of usual democratic decision process like vote. Also, the theorem denies the possibility of decision process accompanied by a long-term commitment like social contract. However, social contract can be protected from Arrow's theorem both normatively and mathematically. This social contract, not the vote, bases durability of liberal democratic society.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(8 results)
