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The effecitiveness of the unanimity rule with sequential voting when jurors are unfair.

Research Project

Project/Area Number 23830087
Research Category

Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up

Allocation TypeSingle-year Grants
Research Field Economic theory
Research InstitutionWaseda University

Principal Investigator

ADACHI Tsuyoshi  早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 助手 (00535122)

Project Period (FY) 2011 – 2012
Project Status Completed (Fiscal Year 2012)
Budget Amount *help
¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2011: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Keywords順位決め / 逐次投票 / ゲーム理論 / メカニズムデザイン / ミクロ経済学 / 経済理論
Research Abstract

We analyze the problem of a jury that must rank a set of contestants (e.g., gymnastics competitions or competitive shows of crafts) whose the socially optimal ranking is common knowledge among jurors. They may have friends among the contestants and may, therefore, be biased in their friends' favor. We show that sequential voting with open ballot instead of secret ballot, is effective as the jury's collective decision-making method to make the jury select the socially optimal ranking.

Report

(3 results)
  • 2012 Annual Research Report   Final Research Report ( PDF )
  • 2011 Annual Research Report
  • Research Products

    (8 results)

All 2012 2011

All Presentation (8 results)

  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2012

    • Author(s)
      Adachi, T.
    • Organizer
      the 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul, Turkey.
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites2012

    • Author(s)
      Tsuyoshi Adachi
    • Organizer
      The 4th World Congress of the Game Theory Society
    • Place of Presentation
      Istanbul (Turkey)
    • Related Report
      2012 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011

    • Author(s)
      Tsuyoshi Adachi
    • Organizer
      International conference on "Applications of game theory in policies and decisions" in honor of Prof.C.R.Rao
    • Place of Presentation
      Hyderabad (India)
    • Year and Date
      2011-12-13
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favoritesand Applications2011

    • Author(s)
      Tsuyoshi Adachi
    • Organizer
      UECE Lisbon Meetings 2011 : Game Theory and Applications
    • Place of Presentation
      Lisbon (Portugal)
    • Year and Date
      2011-11-05
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] Natural implementation in scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011

    • Author(s)
      Tsuyoshi Adachi
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会2011年度秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      筑波大学(茨城県)
    • Year and Date
      2011-10-30
    • Related Report
      2011 Annual Research Report
  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011

    • Author(s)
      Adachi, T.
    • Organizer
      International conference on "Applications of game theory in policies and decisions" in honor of Prof. C.R.Rao.
    • Place of Presentation
      Hyderabad, India.
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] A natural mechanism for scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011

    • Author(s)
      Adachi, T.
    • Organizer
      UECE Lisbon Meetings 2011 : Game Theory and Applications
    • Place of Presentation
      Lisbon, Portugal.
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report
  • [Presentation] Natural implementation in scholarship assignment problems when jurors have favorites2011

    • Author(s)
      Adachi, T.
    • Organizer
      日本経済学会2011年度秋季大会
    • Place of Presentation
      筑波
    • Related Report
      2012 Final Research Report

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Published: 2011-09-05   Modified: 2019-07-29  

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