| Project/Area Number |
23K01318
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Review Section |
Basic Section 07010:Economic theory-related
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Waseda University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
Veszteg Robert 早稲田大学, 政治経済学術院, 教授 (30597753)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2023-04-01 – 2026-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Granted (Fiscal Year 2023)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2025: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
Fiscal Year 2024: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | bargaining / Nash bargaining solution / experiment / cooperative game theory / experimental economics / unstructured interaction |
|---|
| Outline of Research at the Start |
Based on carefully chosen bargaining problems and experimental treatments (in the laboratory) in which participants bargain freely and directly about outcomes or abstract rules of fairness, I will be looking for a more accurate description of bargaining behavior and outcomes.
|
| Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
We have finalized the experimental design for the main experimental treatment in our research project. Given the novel approach to testing the so-called "cooperative bargaining theory" in the laboratory, this has required an extensive review of the existing theoretical literature.
We are planning to test cooperative bargaining theory, and in particular the five axioms behind the popular "Nash bargaining solution", by following one of its interpretations that, to the best of our knowledge, has not been tested empirically yet. To do so, we have explored the theoretical implications of using all possible combinations of an extended list of axioms (including the original five Nash axioms), and programmed zTree to implement an intuitive bargaining problem in the experimental laboratory.
|
| Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
The project has been progressing as initially expected and planned, except for the negative impact caused by the sharp and persistent negative change in exchange rates. The depreciation of the Japanese yen makes running experiments and collecting data abroad (especially in Europe of the United States) for intercultural comparison very costly. Similarly, participating in international conferences remains much more expensive than initially planned.
|
| Strategy for Future Research Activity |
We are planning to run the first pilot sessions in the experimental laboratory at the School of Political Science and Economics, at Waseda University, during the summer. Shorty after that, we should be able to collect all the necessary observations and carry out the data analysis with which we test cooperative bargaining theory.
|
