Project/Area Number |
23K20574
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Project/Area Number (Other) |
21H00666 (2021-2023)
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund (2024) Single-year Grants (2021-2023) |
Section | 一般 |
Review Section |
Basic Section 05040:Social law-related
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Research Institution | Kyushu University |
Principal Investigator |
VAN・UYTSEL S 九州大学, 法学研究院, 教授 (30432842)
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Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
平山 賢太郎 筑波大学, ビジネスサイエンス系, 准教授 (20376396)
McGinty Sean 名古屋大学, 法学研究科, 准教授 (40706818)
M・D FENWICK 九州大学, 法学研究院, 教授 (90315036)
植村 吉輝 阪南大学, 経済学部, 教授 (90388603)
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Project Period (FY) |
2021-04-01 – 2026-03-31
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Project Status |
Granted (Fiscal Year 2024)
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Budget Amount *help |
¥11,830,000 (Direct Cost: ¥9,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥2,730,000)
Fiscal Year 2025: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2024: ¥2,470,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥570,000)
Fiscal Year 2023: ¥2,340,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥540,000)
Fiscal Year 2022: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
Fiscal Year 2021: ¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
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Keywords | horizontal shareholding / mergers / hub-and-spoke cartel / cartel facilitator / Asia / new theory of harm / venture capital / hub and spoke / common ownership / keiretsu / Ola / Softbank / Snapdeal / Flipkart / quiet life theory / competition law / institutional investor / startups / unicorns / GoJek and Grab / common shareholding / fintech / e-commerce |
Outline of Research at the Start |
This project aims to critically evaluate the debate on horizontal shareholding, which is the simultaneous holding of shared by investors in competing companies, and competition law.To provide a new perspective, this project suggests that empirical research needs to be done on active investors as this may facilitate to map the causal links between horizontal shareholding and anti-competitive effects. The project will focus on corporate venture capital. In doing so, the research can focus on Asia’s e-commerce and fintech startups.
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Outline of Annual Research Achievements |
The research achievements are twofold. First, the empirical research has shown that venture capitalists have intervened often in the investees' corporate strategies. This has been most obvious in the case of Ola and Uber. Being investor in both firms, Softbank has been urging Ola to merge with Uber. Softbank also tried to engineer a merger between Flipkart and Snapdeal. There is also information that it was Softbank pushing for the merger between Uber and Grab in South-East Asia. These engineered mergers beg the question whether the concept of killer acquisitions should not be reconsidered towards acquisitions to kill competition by a horizontal shareholder or common owner. Second, the theoretical research has focused on the theory of "quiet life" to explain the reason why horizontal shareholding or common ownership could raise prices or limit product choice. The interesting part of this theory is that it has also been used to explain weaknesses within the keiretsu structure, despite the keiretsu being about cross-ownership. The paradox is that to tackle the quiet life, corporate law reforms have been introduced and these in turn led to the creation of common ownership. This triggers the question on the appropriateness of corporate law to tackle negative outcomes of common ownership.
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Current Status of Research Progress |
Current Status of Research Progress
2: Research has progressed on the whole more than it was originally planned.
Reason
The research has established that common ownership is present in Asia. The research has also indicated the reason. Common ownership as a concept is broader than what the original literature had in mind. The concept of common ownership is still not settled. Common ownership literature has grown within a certain environment: holding shares by institutional investors in publicly traded firms. Asia has shown that the phenomenon is also present in the firms closely held by some major shareholders or in startup firms. Therefore, we need to be specific on what kind of common ownership we will deal with when discussing the applicability of the law.
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Strategy for Future Research Activity |
This part of the project will summarize the existing literature on coordinated and unilateral conduct to identify that the current literature is mainly looking for an argument to apply competition law to horizontal shareholding as such. This will be the basis for investigating to what extent some of the Asian competition laws have an opening to apply to horizontal shareholding as such and theorize on whether it is necessary. However, based upon the empirical study on the influence of corporate VCs on corporate governance of FY 2022, this stage of the research will also show that horizontal shareholding could be subject to more traditional forms of competition law. Horizontal shareholders could be intermediaries contributing to a hub-and-spoke cartel or to joint dominance. In the light of this, the research will 1) contribute to the clarification of these concepts, and 2) focus on whether existing detection methods, like leniency, are sufficient.
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