| Project/Area Number |
24330064
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Section | 一般 |
|---|
| Research Field |
Economic theory
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Musashino University (2013-2016)
Ryutsu Keizai University (2012) |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
|
|---|
| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
グレーヴァ 香子 慶應義塾大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10219040)
松井 彰彦 東京大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 教授 (30272165)
西村 直子 信州大学, 経済学部, 教授 (30218200)
鈴木 伸枝 駒澤大学, 経済学部, 教授 (90365536)
中泉 拓也 関東学院大学, 経済学部, 教授 (00350546)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥17,290,000 (Direct Cost: ¥13,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥3,990,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥4,160,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥960,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥4,810,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,110,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 社会ゲーム / 信頼 / ゲーム理論 / 実験 / 多様性 |
|---|
| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Contemporary world is highly mobile and anonymous, and needs to study social games have increased. We performed theoretical and experimental studies about social games, which analyze mechanisms to maintain discipline and coordination through voluntary formation, continuation and dissolution of economic relationships. In particular, we focused on the Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (VSRPD). In theoretical studies, we showed that states where many different modes of behavior co-exist are evolutionarily stable, in addition to stable states where a single behavioral mode with delayed cooperation which is well-known. In experimental studies, we found the state with diverse behavioral modes occur and found a behavioral mode which forgives partner’s defection and continues to seek for long-run cooperation. This finding leads to a new theoretical result of a stable state with more diverse behavioral modes.
|
