| Project/Area Number |
24330139
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
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| Allocation Type | Partial Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Accounting
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
ITO Kunio 一橋大学, 大学院商学研究科, 教授 (60134889)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
NAKANO Makoto 一橋大学, 大学院商学研究科, 教授 (00275017)
SUZUKI Taketsugu 神戸大学, 経営学研究科, 准教授 (00408692)
OTSUKA Shigeo 千葉大学, 人文社会科学研究科, 教授 (20213770)
NAKAJYO Yusuke 横浜市立大学, 国際マネジメント研究科, 教授 (40244503)
UMEHARA Hidetsugu 明治大学, 会計専門職研究科, 教授 (40282420)
KIM HyonOk 東京経済大学, 経営学部, 准教授 (40547270)
SUZUKI Tomohiro 亜細亜大学, 経営学部, 准教授 (50609021)
URASAKI Naohiro 近畿大学, 経営学部, 教授 (60203600)
OTA Kouji 関西大学, 商学部, 教授 (70366839)
YAZAWA Kenichi 青山学院大学, 経営学部, 准教授 (70406817)
KAGAYA Tetsuyuki 一橋大学, 大学院商学研究科, 准教授 (80323913)
NOMA Mikiharu 一橋大学, 大学院国際企業戦略研究科, 准教授 (80347286)
KAWASHIMA Kenji 法政大学, 経営学部, 教授 (80406652)
TSUMURAYA Shouichi 一橋大学, 大学院商学研究科, 准教授 (90432054)
OCHI Manabu 大分大学, 経済学部, 講師 (90613844)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥17,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥13,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥4,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥4,420,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,020,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥4,940,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,140,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥8,190,000 (Direct Cost: ¥6,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,890,000)
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| Keywords | ショートターミズム / ディスクロージャー / コーポレートガバナンス / 統合報告 / ＲＯＥ / モジュラー型開示 / 伊藤レポート / 業績予想 / リスク情報 / 四半期情報 / 公正価値 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The objective of this research is to identify the relation between accounting and reporting system and corporate short-termism. We adopt archival data analysis, survey research, and interview research to do it.
We found that the sources of corporate short-termism in Japan is different from those of the U.S. firms. Higher management compensation leads to the corporate short-termism in the U.S., meanwhile the lack of dialogue or engagement between top management and shareholders makes top management more risk averse and leads to corporate short-termism in Japan. In addition, information overload by the international convergence or integration of accounting and reporting system promote the short-termism in Japanese firms because top managers and investors cannot keep the enough time to communicate each other. We propose that we need to restructure accounting and reporting system to promote the constructive dialogue or engagement between them in Japan.
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