| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
JFTC 2004 Merger Guidelines introduced unilateral effects analysis . Unilateral merger effects analysis are divided into two parts,(1)homogeneous product markets and (2) differentiated product markets. Commentators usually think that unilateral effects arise in one-shot oligopoly games with Nash equilibria. In the case of homogenous product market ,they refer to Cournot competition model. In the case of differentiated product market ,they refer to Bertrand competition model. But we found that competition authorities seem to use usually dominant-fringe model in homogeneous product markets and rarely use Cournot competition model. In the case of differentiated product markets, not all cases are Bertrand competition model. Some cases correspond to Cournot competition or capacity constrain model and other cases correspond to auction model . Merger investigation is fact-specific process . We must make a choice among several models on the basis of reasonably available data.
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