| Project/Area Number |
24530129
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Politics
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| Research Institution | The University of Tokyo |
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Principal Investigator |
Nakayama Yohei 東京大学, 法学(政治学)研究科(研究院), 教授 (90242065)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
ISHIDA Ken 千葉大学, 法政経学部, 教授 (40211726)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2016-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2015)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,200,000 (Direct Cost: ¥4,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,200,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | 一党支配 / １９７０年代 / 日本 / フランス / イタリア / 1970年代 / 一党支配体制 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
From the mid-1970s, the Conservative one-party dominant regimes in Japan, France and Italy began to rapidly diverge in response to the financial crisis due to the Oil Crisis, as a result of the contrasting power relations between the senior civil servants and the governing parties. In France, the bureaucracy used their remaining power to switch to the strategies of marketization of public money allocation patterns, so that the governing parties began to see their local bases decay. In contrast, the Italian Christian Democrats dared to swell the loan volume of public financial institutions, and endured the serious crises by incorporating the Communists into their clientelist system. In Japan, the structural compromise between the bureaucracy and the LDP worked out the financial arrangements that allowed local clientelist electoral machines to survive, while tightening the bureaucratic control over the local finances. All this resulted in the ever-rationalizing LDP's governing system.
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