Self-Control Games: Theory and Applications
| Project/Area Number |
24530193
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Hitotsubashi University |
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Principal Investigator |
UI Takashi 一橋大学, 大学院経済学研究科, 教授 (60312815)
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TAKEOKA Norio 横浜国立大学, 大学院国際社会科学研究院, 准教授 (80434695)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,680,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,080,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / 意思決定理論 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
A majority of self-control models have been considered in the context of single-person decision making. One's propensity to resist temptation, however, may depend on others' decision, as observed in smoking, overeating, and overspending behaviors. As a self-control model with strategic interaction, we introduce a normal form game in which players have self-control preferences of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, Econometrica). As an application, we consider a game in which players purchase a commitment device to cope with temptation in the presence of peer effects. In some equilibrium, players utilize a small amount of the commitment device in a coordinated manner, but in another equilibrium, they purchase an inefficiently large amount of the commitment device. Thus, restricting commitment options can improve welfare, which is never the case in the context of single-person decision making.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(9 results)
