| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,510,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥810,000)
Fiscal Year 2016: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Many economists analyze various issues of public economics, political economics, international economics etc. in the rent-seeking model. In the rent-seeking model, each player of the game pays some effort or money to seek for the prize of the game. The probability of a player to get the prize can be expressed as a function of the expenditures of all players. Under the assumption that the probability of a player to get the prize can be written as a function called a CSF, each player of the game pays some effort or money to seek for the prize or rent of the theoretical model of rent seeking. In this study we have studied the theory and applications of models of dynamic rent seeking. We have studied various applied models of rent seeking such as a patent race to analyze the theoretical aspects of rent seeking.
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