Mechanism Design under Imperfect Commitment Power
| Project/Area Number |
24530196
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 動学メカニズム / 情報の非対称性 / 契約理論 / コミットメント / 動学契約 / モラルハザード / アドバースセレクション / オークション / 交渉 / 国際研究者交流・台湾 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In the existing literature, it is typically assumed that the principal can perfectly commit to the mechanism she designs, no matter how complicated that may be. In a dynamic setting where information is revealed only gradually over time, however, the principal often has an incentive to deviate to another mechanism at some interim stage. To address this issue, we consider a situation where the principal only has limited commitment power and evaluate how the lack of commitment power alters the equilibrium allocation and its welfare properties.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(5 results)
