An experimental study on repeated games with observation costs
| Project/Area Number |
24530199
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kobe University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2015: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
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| Keywords | 繰り返しゲーム / 観測費用 / 囚人のジレンマ / 無限回繰り返しゲーム / 情報収集 / 効率性 / 実験経済学 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
In this research, we study reputation effect in long-run relationship by using game theory. There are two decision makers (players), and they play prisoner's dilemma game every period. Each player can decide whether to cooperate or defect in each period. If a player pays a cost, he knows the action chosen by the opponent in that period. Otherwise, he cannot knows the action. At the beginning of the repeated game, there is a possibility that a player commits to a certain strategy. That is, a player's strategy is fixed with an exogenously given probability. Such player is called commitment type. If a player is not a commitment type, he can choose any strategy. The objective of the research is to analyze how players play the repeated game in this situation.
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Report
(6 results)
Research Products
(4 results)
