| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigated games with information asymmetry between the players，in which the payoffs of players are changed dynamically and exogenously. We obtained the following two results. First, we examined market entrance games with two players, an incumbent and an entrant, under which the demand of the market are dynamically growing with the uncertainty. We show sufficient conditions that the incumbent enters to the market at the optimal timing, which becomes a signal to the entrant by revealing the incumbent's information. Second, we considered dynamic games on discrete time and with the finite sets of strategies for the players to use existing results of game theory. We obtained sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies for games with the finite sets of strategies for the players.
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