Dynamic games with exogenous uncertainty and information asymmetry between players
| Project/Area Number |
24530200
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Tokyo Metropolitan University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,820,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,400,000、Indirect Cost: ¥420,000)
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| Keywords | ゲーム理論 / リアル・オプション / 情報の非対称性 / 純粋戦略均衡 / 戦略的投資 / 離散時間 / 有限ゲーム / 対称ゲーム / 離散不動点定理 / 国際研究者交流 / オランダ / ティルバーグ大学 / 離散均衡 / リアルオプション |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigated games with information asymmetry between the players，in which the payoffs of players are changed dynamically and exogenously. We obtained the following two results. First, we examined market entrance games with two players, an incumbent and an entrant, under which the demand of the market are dynamically growing with the uncertainty. We show sufficient conditions that the incumbent enters to the market at the optimal timing, which becomes a signal to the entrant by revealing the incumbent's information. Second, we considered dynamic games on discrete time and with the finite sets of strategies for the players to use existing results of game theory. We obtained sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria in pure strategies for games with the finite sets of strategies for the players.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(20 results)
