Accumulating Information in Repeated Financial Transactions: Theory and Experiment
| Project/Area Number |
24530207
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Kansai University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Renkei-kenkyūsha) |
OHTA Katsunori 和歌山大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (60403218)
SAITO Tetsuya 日本大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (80707422)
SHICHIJO Tatsuhiro 大阪府立大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40305660)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,550,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,050,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 長期的関係 / 情報の経済学 / 実験経済学 / 経済実験 / 繰り返しゲーム / 情報の不確実性 / 社会的学習 / 隠れマルコフモデル |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We investigated a moral hazard problem in financial transactions. Specifically, we consider a repeated prisoner's dilemma between two players in which players can not observe the opponent's action but imperfectly observe signals depending on their actions. We compare efficiency losses in the different timings of releasing information combining with the different levels of noise of signals.
We found that the level of cooperation decreases as the timing of releasing signal becomes late. This experimental result implies that timely disclosure policy enhances efficiency in financial markets.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(8 results)
