Project/Area Number |
24530255
|
Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
|
Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Section | 一般 |
Research Field |
Applied economics
|
Research Institution | Hiroshima University |
Principal Investigator |
OKAMURA Makoto 広島大学, 社会(科)学研究科, 教授 (30177084)
|
Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SHINKAI Tetsuya 関西学院大学, 経済学部, 教授 (40206313)
OHKAWA Takao 立命館大学, 経済学部, 教授 (10258494)
TOMODA Yasunobu 神戸市外国語大学, 外国語学部, 准教授 (30437280)
OKUDA Mai 神奈川大学, 経済学部, 助教 (90711549)
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥4,810,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,110,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
|
Keywords | location / oligopoly / subsidy competition / intermediate run / emission tax / free entry / excess entry theorem / location choice / regional competition / tax competition / repeated game / oligopolistic firm / 中期モデル / 企業誘致 / 補助金 / 地域間競争 |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We publish two papers in international academic journals. One paper addresses the sustainability and stability problems of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign governments that aim to maximize tax revenues in a repeated game setting. This paper shows that partial tax coordination is more likely to prevail either if the number of countries in a coalition subgroup is smaller or if the number of existing countries in the entire economy is large. The other paper explores an optimal environmental tax policy in a three-stage game in which polluting firms strategically choose the location of their plants. We show not only that the optimal emission tax is non-decreasing with the declining cost of relocation but also that the firms may move back their relocated plants to the home country.
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