| Project/Area Number |
24530257
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kyushu University |
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Principal Investigator |
FUJITA Toshiyuki 九州大学, 経済学研究科(研究院), 教授 (30297618)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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| Keywords | 環境協定 / 自己拘束性 / ゲーム理論 / 提携形成 / マッチング / 汚染削減技術 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We have examined the effectiveness of matching agreements and environmenral R&D agreements, which seem to be promising schemes of international environmenral agrements. In a paper on the matching agreement, we gave an interpretation of mathing mecahanism in the framework of voluntary provision of public goods, and pointed out the equivalence of the tax-subsidy policies for pollution control and the matching rules. In a paper on the environmenral R&D agreement, we proposed a simpler agreement rule than one in a previous work and showed that it would work more effectively. In another paper, we showed that under an assumption of technology with increasing returns, when the noncooperative equilibrium without agreement is inefficient, R&D agreements always lead to the better situation.
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