Second-best environmental policies under asymmetric information
| Project/Area Number |
24530282
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Kansai University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
SUGETA Hajime 関西大学, 経済学部, 教授 (90330167)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥4,030,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥930,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
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| Keywords | 非対称情報 / 環境政策 / セカンドベスト / 課税 / 排出権取引 / 保険 / 環境保険 / 間接表明メカニズム / 試行錯誤 / 排出権取引制度 / 環境税 / 長期 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We consider optimal environmental policies under asymmetric information between polluters and the government. We also consider two types of private information. They are cost efficiency represented by parameters and the behavior of polluters itself like emission. Our study is composed of three works. In the two of them we consider type I private information. In the first project we developed a mechanism that can attain the first best, while in the second project we compared between tax and emission trading scheme in the long run. In the final project, we considered type II private information and derived a mechanism that can attain the first best.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(10 results)
