What should the government buy?Study on innovation and role of the government.
| Project/Area Number |
24530329
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Economic policy
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| Research Institution | Aichi University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Co-Investigator(Kenkyū-buntansha) |
TAKEDA Yosuke 上智大学, 経済学部, 教授 (20266068)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥5,070,000 (Direct Cost: ¥3,900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥1,170,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥2,600,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥600,000)
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| Keywords | 財政支出乗数 / イノベーション / 法的執行 / TFP / 特化の経済性 / 空間VAR |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Do legal enforcements for competition policy have differential effects on innovative research and development activities? Taking into account both strategic R&D competition between incumbent and entrant, and government’s optimal choice of legal schemes, we first present a game-theoretic model of innovation and legal enforcement. Second, focusing on overseas subsidiaries of the Japanese auto-parts suppliers that have international deployments with different legal origins in locations, we use a pooled data set of the Basic Survey of Overseas Business Activities and the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities. It suggests that under regulation as a legal enforcement scheme instead of strict liability or negligence, even in countries with low degree of law and order, R&D activities would be more enhanced and R&D-deterrent ones be further suppressed on average. Legalenforcement for competition policy does matter for innovation.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(7 results)
