| Project/Area Number |
24530348
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Section | 一般 |
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| Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
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| Research Institution | Osaka University |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
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| Keywords | 戦略的委任 / 補完性 / 租税競争 / 地球環境問題 / 中位投票者定理 / 非対称地域 / 戦略的補完性 / 政策競争 / 戦略的代替性 / 戦略的投票 / 環境政策 / 地方分権理論（財政連邦主義） / 環境規制 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
I have analyzed the consequences of "strategic delegation", where citizens deliberately choose a delegate with different preferences from their own to pursue strategic advantages.I showed that the consequence of the strategic delegation crucially depends on complementarity. I also investigated the second-order condition of the obtained solutions and the emergence of asymmetric equilibria which were not studied in the previous researches.I also reexamined the work of the leadership in tax competition models. A previous paper showed that the leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium, in a model where the regional asymmetry translates into different gradients of the
demand for capital but identical vertical intercepts. By reversing the form of asymmetry with different vertical intercepts and identical gradients,I show that leadership by the large region becomes the risk dominant equilibrium and can even become Pareto superior.
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