Game Theoretic Analyses of the Stablitiy of Patent Pools and Their Formation Process
| Project/Area Number |
24730163
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Chiba University (2014)
Tokyo Institute of Technology (2012-2013) |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,730,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥630,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 特許権 / ライセンス契約 / ゲーム理論 / ライセンス料交渉 / パテントプール / 交渉 / ライセンス料配分 / 安定性 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
We analyze patent licensing agreements signed by a patent holder and oligopolistic firms in practical situations, and examine the stability of patent pools that are formed by multiple patent holders. The main results of this research show the number of licensees and the licensing policies that most benefit a patent holder in various patent licensing problems. Furthermore, by focusing on licensing revenue allocation in patent pools, we propose the condition under which different types of patent holders form stable patent pools.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
