| Project/Area Number |
24730164
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | University of Marketing and Distribution Sciences |
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Principal Investigator |
MARUYAMA Akiko 流通科学大学, 経済学部, 准教授 (00508715)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2017-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2016)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,040,000 (Direct Cost: ¥800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥240,000)
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| Keywords | 不完全自己認識 / ランダムサーチ / 学習 / 情報の経済学 / 労働市場 / 結婚市場 / サーチ / サーチ理論 / 両方向サーチ / overconfidence / two-sided search / underconfidence |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
This study analyzes a random search model in which agents do not know their own type. Agents with imperfect self-knowledge learn their type when they receive an offer or rejection from others. We find that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge lowers his or her reservation level if the agent receives a rejection. However, they does not raise his or her reservation level even if the agent receives an offer. As a result, a series of meetings gradually lowers his or her reservation level through the duration of the search.
In the learning process, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge frequently rejects (accepts) a person of the opposite sex whom he or she would accept (reject) when he or she knows his or her own type. This optimistic (pessimistic) behavior influences both the agent's matching behavior. Moreover, the optimism of some agents prevents the lowest-type agents from matching. However, the pessimism of some agents does not affect the matching of the lowest-type agents.
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