| Project/Area Number |
24730196
|
|---|
| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
|
| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
|---|
| Research Field |
Applied economics
|
|---|
| Research Institution | Nihon University |
|---|
Principal Investigator |
OKI Ryoko 日本大学, 商学部, 助教 (20612493)
|
|---|
| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2014-03-31
|
| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
|
| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,560,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,200,000、Indirect Cost: ¥360,000)
|
|---|
| Keywords | 競争政策 / 法と経済学 / 産業組織論 / 法の経済分析 |
|---|
| Research Abstract |
This study investigates competition in downstream distributors which have platform characteristics such as online market place and performance rights organizations. Particularly, I consider competition between platforms with potential entrants and effect of vertical restraints. I analyze economic models based on actual antitrust cases. Especially, we consider the entry-blocking effect of fixed-fee pricing by incumbents, We show that factors blocking entry include not only the fixed-fee used by the incumbent downstream firm but also the fact that the incumbent already has a good to sell. Therefore, even if the fixed-fee is restricted and the incumbent is forced to adopt unit pricing, it is possible that entry would still not occur. Moreover, such a restriction may have a welfare decreasing effect, even if it promotes entry. This result has an important implication for JASRAC v. JTFC Case and related cases.
|
