| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,640,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,800,000、Indirect Cost: ¥840,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
Using a theoretical model, this study compares the implications of civil and criminal penalty schemes from the viewpoint of social welfare, where civil and criminal schemes are distinguished by whether penalties are paid to the patent holder or the government.
We find that depending on the development cost of the goods, the government should set the expected penalties either to zero or to a level that makes the producer’s profit zero. We also show that civil punishment for patent infringement is socially desirable in general setting.
However, we also find that imposing small criminal punishments may be socially desirable when the penalties paid by illegal user depend on lost profits of the patent holder.
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