| Project/Area Number |
24730224
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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| Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
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| Research Field |
Applied economics
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| Research Institution | Shinshu University (2013-2014)
Tokyo University of Science (2012) |
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Principal Investigator |
TAKESHI EBINA 信州大学, 学術研究院社会科学系, 講師 (00579766)
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥3,380,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥780,000)
Fiscal Year 2014: ¥910,000 (Direct Cost: ¥700,000、Indirect Cost: ¥210,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,170,000 (Direct Cost: ¥900,000、Indirect Cost: ¥270,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
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| Keywords | 産業組織論 / 産業組織 / 立地 / 製品差別化 / 競争政策 / 立地競争 / 独占禁止法 / ホテリングモデル / 社会厚生 / 立地-数量競争 / 立地モデル / 厚生分析 / 合併 |
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| Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The purpose of this study is to investigate a location choice of firms and to offer a policy implication. First, I construct a unidirectional model where consumers can only buy from one direction. I show that the equilibrium outcome of the previous study does not constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In addition, applying my conjoint analysis to the book market of Japan, I investigate the relationship between product attributes and the optimal price. Second, I study the price and welfare effects of a merger of firms producing unidirectional complements. I show that a merger raises a price of a good, resulting in lower consumer surplus. This result is in sharp contrast to Cournot's classical implication that a merger in strict complements makes all consumers strictly better off. Furthermore, I apply a method, which utilizes the idea of pass-through in an analysis of third-degree price discrimination, to compare consumer surplus under vertical integration and separation.
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