The difference in corporate governance system and its effect on firm values
Project/Area Number |
24730276
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Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
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Allocation Type | Multi-year Fund |
Research Field |
Public finance/Monetary economics
|
Research Institution | Hosei University |
Principal Investigator |
|
Project Period (FY) |
2012-04-01 – 2015-03-31
|
Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2014)
|
Budget Amount *help |
¥1,430,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,100,000、Indirect Cost: ¥330,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥650,000 (Direct Cost: ¥500,000、Indirect Cost: ¥150,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥780,000 (Direct Cost: ¥600,000、Indirect Cost: ¥180,000)
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Keywords | コーポレートガバナンス / 株式市場の規律付け / 株式市場の情報効率性 / 株価の安定性 / 機関投資家の規律付け / 銀行によるガバナンス |
Outline of Final Research Achievements |
The object of this project is to provide empirical evidence on what type of governance system contributes to improvement of long-term firm values. First, I find that bank-firm lending relationships impair firm values in the long run. However, when the relationships are short-term, firm values improve. In the second study of this project, I find that larger institutional ownership leads to higher volatility of stock prices in the short run. This is because that larger institutional ownership allows investors to lend shares and some index funds trade in the same direction. Empirical evidence in this project suggests that corporate managers have to care about ownership/debt structures of their firms. Considering ownership/debt structures of firms is important to achieve improvement of firm values.
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Report
(4 results)
Research Products
(8 results)