Goods Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
| Project/Area Number |
24830004
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| Research Category |
Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up
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| Allocation Type | Single-year Grants |
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| Research Field |
Economic theory
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| Research Institution | Otaru University of Commerce |
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Principal Investigator |
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| Project Period (FY) |
2012-08-31 – 2014-03-31
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| Project Status |
Completed (Fiscal Year 2013)
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| Budget Amount *help |
¥2,990,000 (Direct Cost: ¥2,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥690,000)
Fiscal Year 2013: ¥1,300,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,000,000、Indirect Cost: ¥300,000)
Fiscal Year 2012: ¥1,690,000 (Direct Cost: ¥1,300,000、Indirect Cost: ¥390,000)
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| Keywords | 組合わせオークション / 収益単調性 / 需要の価格弾力性 / 独占 / Auction Design / Revenue Monotonicity / Elasticity / Monopoly / Game Theory / Substitutes / Complements |
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| Research Abstract |
We study a new monotonicity problem in combinatorial auctions called goods revenue monotonicity, which requires that the auctioneer earn no more revenue by dropping goods from the endowments.
Although no mechanism satisfies goods revenue monotonicity together with other desirable properties, we find a restricted domain in which there exists a goods revenue monotone mechanism satisfying the above three conditions. The restriction is likely to be met when the number of active bidders is sufficiently large.
This suggests that it is important that governments eliminate all barriers to entry and invite bids when they auction their public goods.
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Report
(3 results)
Research Products
(6 results)
